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Vector autoregressive (VAR) models have become a popular tool for analyzing the
e®ects of monetary policy on the aggregate economy. Despite the popularity, VAR
models have been criticized as they occasionally display a controversial result,
namely a rise in in°ation { that prevails at least temporary { after a monetary
contraction. Sims (1992) originally commented on this phenomenon, which has
been labeled the price puzzle (Eichenbaum, 1992).
In a VAR model, the presence of a price puzzle casts serious doubts on the pos-
sibility of properly identifying a monetary policy shock. Sims (1992) points out
that central banks focus on a variety of variables useful for forecasting future in-
°ation that are possibly neglected in the econometric speci¯cation, which implies
that the unexpected part of a monetary policy shock is insu±ciently measured.
Consequently, the price puzzle should be mitigated once indicators of nascent in-
°ation { such as commodity prices { are additionally accounted for (Sims, 1992;
Leeper, Sims and Zha, 1996; Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 1999).
In contrast, Barth and Ramey (2000) refer to the cost channel of monetary
policy as an alternative explanation for an increase in in°ation after a monetary
tightening. The cost channel is operating alongside the interest rate channel { i.e.
the standard aggregate demand channel { by stating that ¯rms depend on credit
to ¯nance production, which means that their pricing decisions are directly related
to credit conditions since marginal production costs are a®ected by interest rates.
Accordingly, a shift of in°ation in response to a monetary policy shock is not
necessarily evidence for misspeci¯cation but follows from a worsening of credit
conditions due to an increase in interest rates.1
This paper estimates a New Keynesian DSGE model for the euro area with
the intention to explore whether the cost channel is capable to explain an initial
rise in in°ation after a monetary contraction. The model comprises three sectors,
namely ¯rms, households and banks, which are assumed to have some monopoly
power over prices, wages and interest rates that are all set { as in Calvo (1983)
{ in a staggered way. The cost channel is accounted for by noting that ¯rms
require loans from banks as they are obliged to pre{¯nance their production,
1Barth and Ramey (2000) reach this conclusion by exploring industry level data for the
U.S. which shows that prices increase after a monetary tightening even if commodity prices are
explicitly accounted for. However, the cost channel may be capable to explain an initial shift
in in°ation after a monetary tightening, but it is hardly capable to explain a price puzzle that
lasts for several years.
1which implies that price setting, and hence in°ation, is directly a®ected by interest
rates. The relevance of the cost channel of monetary transmission is supported
by micro{evidence for the euro area that underlines the relative importance of
¯nancial costs as a driving factor for price changes.2
As in Rotemberg and Woodford (1998) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Evans (2005), we estimate the DSGE model by using a minimum distance ap-
proach, which comprises two steps. In the ¯rst step, we specify a VAR model to
generate empirical impulse responses to a monetary policy shock. Even though
we explicitly incorporated commodity prices, in°ation initially rises after a mon-
etary contraction. In the second step, we estimate the parameters of the DSGE
model by matching the theoretical impulse responses as closely as possible to the
empirical impulse responses.
Our analysis is closely related to the study of Rabanal (2007), who explores
the relevance of the cost channel in the U.S. on the basis of a DSGE model with
sticky prices and wages that is estimated by adopting a Bayesian procedure. His
results suggest that the cost channel fails as an explanation for the price puzzle as
he ¯nds that \the presence of the cost channel is not enough to generate a positive
response of in°ation after a monetary policy contraction" (Rabanal, 2007, p. 919).
An initial rise of in°ation is stimulated by an increase in interest rates that enter
marginal production costs, but the shift is completely o®set by declines in the real
wage and the real rental rate of capital, even when wages are set in a staggered
way and capital utilization is assumed to be highly variable, which makes the
rental rate of capital less volatile. In a similar vein, Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans (2005) estimate a general equilibrium model and conclude that the
importance of the cost channel in the U.S. is only minor. Even though a price
puzzle emerges in the empirical impulse responses they use for minimizing the
distance, the cost channel only contributes to explain in°ation inertia, which
emerges after a monetary contraction, while in°ation immediately falls.
Other studies using a single equation approach report empirical evidence for
the cost channel that is more promising. For the U.S., Ravenna and Walsh (2006)
estimate an augmented New Keynesian Phillips curve by Generalized Method of
Moments (GMM) and ¯nd that the evolution of in°ation is signi¯cantly a®ected
2In the surveys conducted by the ECB's In°ation Persistence Network (see Fabiani et al.,
2005) ¯rms in major euro area countries were asked to assign scores between 4 (greater im-
portance) and 1 (minor importance) to cost factors according to their importance for price
adjustments. Financial costs received an average score of 2.1. With 2.6 the average score of
labor costs was only slightly higher.
2by changes in interest rates. Using a similar approach, Chowdhury, Ho®mann, and
Schabert (2006) show that the cost channel is relevant in the U.S. and the U.K.,
but not in Germany and in Japan, which possibly indicates that the structure of
the ¯nancial system { a market{based system versus a bank{based system { has
an impact on the consequences of monetary policy actions.
Our analysis departs from the work of Rabanal (2007) in several distinctive
aspects: (i) instead of modeling banks as neutral conveyors of monetary im-
pulses, we take into account the empirical evidence of a sticky and incomplete
pass{through from money market rates to short{term loan rates in the euro area
(de Bondt, 2005) and incorporate a banking sector that sets the loan rate ac-
cording to a Calvo{type staggered price setting approach; (ii) instead of using
a full{information Bayesian estimation technique, we explore the VAR{related
price puzzle by adopting a minimum distance estimation, which is limited to the
response of the model's variables to a monetary policy shock; and (iii) instead of
using U.S. data, we apply our model to the euro area, where the ¯nancial system
is bank{based rather than market{based as in the U.S.3
Our ¯ndings suggest that the cost channel in the euro area is incapable to pro-
duce a price puzzle in an unrestricted regression, but its presence helps to generate
an initially concave response of in°ation to a monetary contraction. The fall in
in°ation is retarded in the ¯rst quarters following the shock, before it pursues the
traditional hump{shaped and convex response, which can be attributed to the
sluggish reaction of real marginal costs that comes along with the simultaneous
increase in interest rates { i.e. a tightening of credit conditions { and decreases in
the real wage and the real rental rate of capital. An immediate increase of in°a-
tion only arises by imposing a higher nominal wage rigidity and/or a lower degree
of price stickiness. Interestingly, already small deviations from the estimated pa-
rameters are su±cient to create the price puzzle, so that the restrictions are not
rejected by the data. To our knowledge, this is the ¯rst empirical paper showing
that the cost channel helps to explain the price puzzle in a general equilibrium
framework.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, the New Keynesian model
with the cost channel of monetary policy is set out. Section 3 presents the results
of the minimum distance estimation, including several checks on weak identi¯ca-
3In a related study, Rabanal (2003) also explores the e®ects of the cost channel in the euro
area and draws similar conclusions as in Rabanal (2007). Notice however that except for item
(iii) our analysis departs likewise from this work.
3tion. In Section 4, we discuss the capability of the cost channel to reproduce an
immediate increase of in°ation after a monetary policy shock. Section 5 summa-
rizes the main ¯ndings and concludes.
2 The Model
We employ a New Keynesian Model that consists of ¯rms, households and banks.
Firms are partitioned into ¯nal good producers and a continuum of intermediate
good producers which each produce a di®erentiated type of good by using capital
and labor services. Intermediate good producers have some monopoly power over
prices that are set in a staggered way as in Calvo (1983). Households obtain utility
from consumption and leisure, they supply a di®erentiated type of labor, own the
capital stock and make investment decisions. They decide on their wages, which
are also set { similar to prices { in a staggered way. Finally, banks extent loans
to ¯rms in an environment of monopolistic competition. They face frictions when
choosing their loan rates, which implies that the aggregate loan rate responds
sluggishly to a monetary policy shock.
The model builds on the framework of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans
(2005), Smets and Wouters (2003), Gal¶ ³, Gertler, and L¶ opez-Salido (2001) and
Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000) by sharing the same kind of nominal and real
rigidities. Following Rabanal (2007) we account for a cost channel of monetary
policy by assuming that a fraction of ¯rms require loans from banks, as they are
obliged to pay their wage bill in advance of selling their product.
2.1 Final Good Producers
Final good producers operate under perfect competition. The technology to pro-











where Yt is the ¯nal good, Yt(i) are the intermediate goods indexed by i 2 (0;1),
and ² > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between the di®erent types of goods.
Pro¯t maximization by the ¯nal good producers leads to the following demand






Yt; for all i 2 (0;1); (2)
4where Pt denotes the price of the ¯nal good, which is derived from the zero pro¯t










and Pt(i) is the price of the intermediate goods.
2.2 Intermediate Good Producers
Firms indexed by i 2 (0;1) operate in an environment of monopolistic competi-
tion. Each ¯rm i has access to the technology:





where ~ Kt(i) denotes capital services, which is the e®ective utilization of the capital
stock given by: ~ Kt(i) = utKt¡1(i), with ut describing the capital utilization rate,
Nt(i) denotes labor services and ® 2 (0;1) is the capital share of output. (Smets
and Wouters, 2003).
Nominal pro¯ts by ¯rm i are given by
¦
firm





t (i) are nominal production costs. For the mass of ¯rms i 2 [0;º],
which are required to take up loans Lt(i) from banks to pay their wage bill
WtNt(i), nominal production costs are determined by: Q
firm
t (i) = RL
t WtNt(i) +
RK
t ~ Kt(i), where the wage rate Wt, the gross loan rate RL
t and the rental rate of
capital RK
t are taken as given. For the remaining ¯rms nominal production costs
are given by: Q
firm
t (i) = WtNt(i)+RK
t ~ Kt(i). Loan repayment by ¯rms occurs at
the end of each period.












where Á > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between the di®erent labor types j
in production. Each ¯rm obtains the optimal mix of labor by choosing its labor

















aggregate wage index and Wt(j) is the wage of labor type j.
Firms have market power for their own product. They maximize expected
pro¯ts using a stochastic discount factor ¤t;t+k that is equal to the intertempo-
ral marginal rate of substitution of a representative household as de¯ned below.
Pro¯ts are distributed to households at the end of each period. We assume that
¯rms make all their decisions prior to the realization of any time t disturbances
(Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans, 2005).4
Firms face price frictions as in Calvo (1983), which implies a staggered price
setting. The price level Pt is determined in each period as a weighted average of
a fraction of ¯rms 1 ¡ µp that resets their prices and a fraction of ¯rms µp that










t is the reset price. Firms that reset their prices are further decomposed
into a fraction 1 ¡ !p that re{optimize their prices and a fraction !p that set
their prices by applying an indexation rule to past in°ation (Gal¶ ³, Gertler, and
L¶ opez-Salido, 2001).
Pro¯t maximization by the ¯rms that are allowed to set their price optimally

















t (i) is the optimal price, Et¡1 denotes the expectation operator, condi-
tional on the set of information available at time t¡1, and 't(i) are real marginal



























for i 2 ]º;1]
; (10)
with © = ®®(1¡®)1¡®. The optimal price is related to the expected real marginal
costs, i.e. P
f
t (i) is a mark{up over the weighted expected real marginal costs.
4This implies that the decisions made by ¯rms at time t are predetermined, which is con-
sistent with the identi¯cation restrictions of a empirical VAR model considered below in which
output and in°ation are prevented from responding contemporaneously to a monetary policy
shock.
6Finally, the fraction of ¯rms !p that reset their prices in each period by index-
ing to past in°ation, set their prices according to: P b
t = P ¤
t¡1(Pt¡1=Pt¡2) (Gal¶ ³,












There is a continuum of households indexed by j 2 (0;1). Households decide
on consumption and savings, they supply a di®erentiated type of labor, own the







where Et¡1 is the expectation operator, conditional on the information set avail-
able at time t ¡ 1, and ¯ 2 (0;1) is a discount factor.










where Ct(j) denotes consumption expenditures, ¾ is the coe±cient of relative risk
aversion, Nt(j) denotes labor supply and ´ is the elasticity of marginal disutility
of labor. Ht describes external habits, which depend positively on consumption
of the aggregate household sector in period t ¡ 1, Ht = hCt¡1.
Household j maximizes its expected lifetime utility subject to the intertem-
poral budget constraint:
PtCt(j) + PtIt(j) + Dt(j) = Wt(j)Nt(j) + [R
K
t ut(j) ¡ Ptª(ut(j))]Kt¡1(j)
+R
D
t¡1Dt¡1(j) + Divt(j); (14)
the downward sloped demand equation for labor (7) and the capital accumulation
equation:








where ± describes the capital depreciation rate.
Each household decides on consumption Ct(j) and investment It(j) expendi-
tures, holds deposits Dt(j) o®ered by banks at the gross deposit rate RD
t and
7receives income from supplying labor Wt(j)Nt(j), from renting capital services to
¯rms, which is equal to the return on the capital stock RK
t ut(j)Kt¡1(j) net of the
costs arising from changes in the degree of capital utilization Ptª(ut(j))Kt¡1(j),
and from obtaining dividends Divt(j) obtained from ¯rms and banks that are
distributed at the end of each period. Since capital is predetermined at the be-
ginning of the period, the income from renting out capital services depends on
the level of capital Kt¡1(j), which was installed at the end of the last period,
and the capital utilization rate ut(j). The costs of capital utilization are assumed
to equal zero when the capital utilization rate is one, i.e. ª(1) = 0 (Smets and
Wouters, 2003).
We assume that households have access to state{contingent securities that
insure them against variations in household{speci¯c labor income. This ensures
that, in a symmetric equilibrium, households are homogenous with respect to con-
sumption and asset holdings (Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans, 2005). More-
over, we assume that households make all their decisions { similar to ¯rms { prior
to the realization of any time t disturbances.
The evolution of the capital stock as shown in equation (15) accounts for the
existence of capital adjustment costs that are introduced through the function





> 0 (Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans, 2005).
Consumption and savings decisions Maximizing the objective function (12)
subject to the intertemporal budget constraint (14) with respect to consumption
and savings delivers the following ¯rst{order conditions:










where ¸t is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the intertemporal budget
constraint that equals marginal utility of consumption.
Staggered wage setting Following Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000), we
assume that households set their wages { similar to prices { in a staggered way
at random intervals. Only a fraction of households 1 ¡ µw resets their nominal
wages in period t, while the remaining fraction µw leaves their nominal wages













t is the newly set wage. Households that reset their wages in each period
are further decomposed into a fraction 1¡!w that re{optimize their nominal wages
and a fraction !w that adjust their nominal wages by applying an indexation rule
to past in°ation.
Optimizing households choose their wages so as to maximize their objective
function (12) subject to the downward sloping demand equation for their type of




















t (j) denotes the optimal nominal wage.
Households that reset their nominal wages by indexing to past in°ation are
assumed to set their wages according to: W b
t = W ¤
t¡1(Pt¡1=Pt¡2). The dynamics










Capital and investment decisions Households increase their supply of cap-
ital services either by investing in new capital, which takes one period to be
installed, or by changing the utilization rate of already installed capital. Both
actions are costly in terms of foregone consumption (Smets and Wouters, 2003).
The ¯rst{order conditions for the real shadow value of capital, investment and








































where Qt denotes the real shadow value of installed capital, i.e. Tobin's Q, ¤t;t+k
describes the stochastic discount factor given by: ¤t;t+k = ¯k(¸t+k=¸t), and rK
t
denotes the real rental rate of capital.
92.4 Banks
Banks indexed by i 2 (0;1) extend loans to ¯rms in an environment of monopo-
listic competition. Pro¯ts by bank i are given by:
¦
bank
t (i) = R
L
t (i)Lt(i) ¡ R
D
t Dt(i) ¡ R
M
t Bt(i); (23)
where Lt(i) is the loan volume, RL
t (i) is the gross loan rate, Dt(i) is the level
of deposits, RD
t is the gross deposit rate, Bt(i) is the net position on the money
market and RM
t is the gross money market rate, which is controlled by the central
bank. Pro¯ts are distributed to households at the end of each period.
For each bank the balance sheet constraint is:
Lt(i) = Dt(i) + Bt(i); (24)
which relates the loan volume to the level of deposits and the net position on the
money market.5 Deposits and money market credits are assumed to represent
perfect substitutes for re¯nancing, which implies that the deposit rate always
equals the money market rate, i.e. RD
t = RM
t (Freixas and Rochet, 1997).
As in Carletti, Hartmann, and Spagnolo (2007), we assume that banks o®er
di®erentiated loans and compete in their loan rates. The di®erentiation of loans
may emerge from specialization in certain types of lending (e.g. to small/large
¯rms or to di®erent sectors) or in certain geographical areas. Each bank faces a









where Lt is the aggregate loan level and RL
t is the average gross loan rate. The
interest rate elasticity of loan demand is denoted by ³ > 1. Equation (25) is
derived from the cost minimization problem of intermediate good ¯rms that hold
a diversi¯ed loan portfolio.
Banks face frictions when setting the loan rate as in Calvo (1983). We assume
that a fraction of banks 1 ¡ ¿ re{optimizes the loan rate in each period t, while
the remaining fraction ¿ keeps the loan rate unchanged.
Pro¯t maximization by the banks that are allowed to set their loan rate opti-

















5Notice that Bt(i) can either be positive or negative depending on whether the bank borrows
or lends on net on the interbank money market.
10where RL¤
t (i) is the optimal loan rate and ¤t;t+k is the stochastic discount factor.
Banks are assumed { in contrast to ¯rms and households { to reset their loan
rates in each period after the realization of any disturbances.













2.5 Final Goods Market Equilibrium and Monetary Pol-
icy
The equilibrium in the ¯nal goods market is characterized by the equality of
production and demand by households for consumption and investment adjusted
for the resource costs attached to variable capital utilization:
Yt = Ct + It + ª(ut)Kt¡1: (28)
The market clearing conditions in the capital rental market, the loan market and
the labor market require that supply equals demand at the prevailing market
prices.
Finally, we assume that the central bank conducts monetary policy by means
of an interest rate reaction function that is speci¯ed below.
2.6 The Linearized Model
We summarize our model by taking a log{linear approximation of the equations
(1) to (28) around the symmetric equilibrium steady state with zero in°ation. A
variable ^ Xt denotes in the following the log linear deviation from the steady state
value: ^ Xt = ln(Xt) ¡ ln( ¹ X), where ¹ X represents the steady state value.
The dynamics of real output is described by the goods market equilibrium that
can be stated as:







where °C = 1 ¡ [®±(1 ¡ 1
²)=( 1
¯ ¡ 1 + ±)].












t ¡ ¼t+1); (30)
11where the in°ation rate ¼t is de¯ned as ¼t = b Pt ¡ b Pt¡1. Consumption depends
on a weighted average of expected future consumption and past consumption,
which results from the presence of external habit formation. In the absence of
habit formation, i.e. h = 0, equation (30) collapses to a purely forward looking
IS{equation.












Et¡1 b Qt; (31)
which shows that investment has a forward and backward looking component.
This hybrid form comes from the particular speci¯cation of the investment ad-
justment cost function, which helps to capture the humped{shaped response of in-
vestment to a monetary policy shock (Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans, 2005).
The real shadow value of capital evolves according to:
b Qt = ¯(1 ¡ ±)Et¡1 b Qt+1 + [1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ±)]Et¡1b r
K
t+1 ¡ Et¡1(b R
M
t ¡ ¼t+1): (32)
The current real shadow value of capital depends positively on the expected future
real shadow value and the expected future real rental rate of capital and negatively
on the ex ante expected real interest rate.
The capital accumulation equation is standard:
b Kt = (1 ¡ ±) b Kt¡1 + ±b It; (33)
implying that the capital stock evaluated at the end of the current period is
determined by the previous capital stock and investment expenditures.
The real rental rate of capital is determined by:
b r
K
t = b Yt ¡ b ut ¡ b Kt¡1 + b 't: (34)
For the capital utilization equation it holds that:
b ut = Ãb r
K
t ; (35)
where Ã = ª0(1)=ª00(1), assuming that the capital utilization rate equals one in
steady state.
The evolution of in°ation is described by a hybrid New Keynesian Phillips
curve:




µp + !p[1 ¡ µp(1 ¡ ¯)]
°b =
!p
µp + !p[1 ¡ µp(1 ¡ ¯)]
·p =
(1 ¡ µp)(1 ¡ ¯µp)(1 ¡ !p)
µp + !p[1 ¡ µp(1 ¡ ¯)]
:
The dynamics of the in°ation rate is characterized by a forward and backward
looking component in addition to the evolution of real marginal costs. For the
parameters °f and °b it holds that °f + °b = 1, for ¯ ! 1. The parameter ·
measures the sensitivity of in°ation with respect to real marginal costs.
Real marginal costs are given by:
b 't = ®b r
K
t + (1 ¡ ®)(c Wt ¡ b Pt + º b R
L
t ); (37)
and depend on the real rental rate of capital, real wages and the gross loan rate.
The dependency of real marginal costs on the gross loan rate implies that { as
emphasized by the cost channel of monetary policy { cyclical movements in the
in°ation process arise { inter alia { from deviations of the nominal gross loan rate
from its steady state.
The development of nominal wage in°ation is determined by the wage setting
behavior of households, which implies the following expression:











!w + µw[1 ¡ !w(1 ¡ ¯µw)]
½2 =
!w(1 ¡ µw)
!w + µw[1 ¡ !w(1 ¡ ¯µw)]
·w =
(1 ¡ µw)(1 ¡ ¯µw)(1 ¡ !w)
!w + µw[1 ¡ !w(1 ¡ ¯µw)](1 + ´Á)







(b ut + b Kt¡1) +
¾
1 ¡ h
(b Ct ¡ hb Ct¡1): (39)
13Nominal wage in°ation is determined by future and past nominal wage in°ation,
by the current and past in°ation rate and by the gap between the marginal rate
of substitution and the real wage.
The evolution of the gross loan rate is governed by the following expression:
b R
L
t = ¯³1Et b R
L
t+1 + ³1 b R
L








(1 ¡ ¯¿)(1 ¡ ¿)
1 + ¯¿2 :
The loan rate is determined by the expected future loan rate, the past loan rate
and the money market rate. The pass{through from changes in the money market
rate to changes in the loan rate becomes complete, if ¿ goes to zero, which implies
that b RL
t = b RM
t .
We close the model by adding the reaction function of the central bank, which
is described by the following interest rate rule:
b R
M
t = ¹1 b R
M
t¡1 + ¹2 b R
M










Et(b Yt+1 + b Yt+2)
#
+ ¹¢b Y¢b Yt + z
M
t (41)
where ¹1 and ¹2 capture the degree of interest rate smoothing, ¹¼ and ¹b Y are the
reaction coe±cients with respect to the present and past in°ation rate and the
expected future output gap, ¹¢b Y is the coe±cient of the change of the output gap
and zM
t is the monetary policy shock. The speci¯cation of the reaction function
is purely empirical, as it delivers interest dynamics that are very close to those
observed in the data.6
3 Empirical Results
Following Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and Rotemberg and Wood-
ford (1998), we estimate our New Keynesian DSGE model with the cost channel
6This speci¯cation is similar to the one chosen by Smets and Wouters (2003) and Boivin and
Giannoni (2006). Instead of determining the policy rule parameters by a minimum distance
estimation, we also tried to directly implement the policy rule implied by the estimated VAR
model (see for example Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 2005, and Giannoni and Woodford,
2005). Such a rule, however, was very prone to indeterminacy.
14for the euro area { the log{linearized equations (29) to (41) { by using a minimum
distance approach that comprises two steps. In the ¯rst step, we specify a VAR
model to generate empirical impulse responses to a monetary policy shock. In
the second step, we estimate the parameters of the DSGE model by matching
the theoretical impulse responses as closely as possible to the empirical impulse
responses.
Certainly, more e±cient estimates of the parameters could be obtained by
exploiting the response of the economy to other shocks (as for example in Altig
et al., 2005). But this potential e±ciency gain must be weighted against the
cost of additional identifying assumptions that would be required. Moreover, to
the extent that the model is unable to explain all the features of the data, the
estimation on the basis of responses to monetary shocks allows us to focus the
estimation on the relevant empirical features of the data that we seek to explain.
In this sense, the estimation approach is robust to the identi¯cation of other
shocks and to the speci¯cation of parts of the model that are not related to the
impulse response functions we are interested in.
3.1 Empirical Impulse Responses
We employ a VAR model for the euro area of the form:
Zt = A(L)Zt¡1 + ¹ + "t; (42)
where Zt is a vector of endogenous variables, A(L) describes parameter matrices,
¹ is a vector of constant terms and "t is a vector of error terms that are assumed
to be white noise. The vector Zt comprises the variables:
Zt = (GDPt;INFLt;WINFLt;CPINFLt;RMt;RLt)
0;
where GDPt stands for real output, INFLt for the in°ation rate, WINFLt for nominal
wage in°ation, CPINFLt for commodity price in°ation, RMt for the policy rate of
the central bank, which is approximated by a short{term money market rate, and
RLt for the short{term loan rate. The inclusion of CPINFLt re°ects the intention
to avoid a priori any possible problems of misspeci¯cation (Sims, 1992).
The VAR model is estimated by using quarterly data over the period from 1990
to 2002.7 The output level is expressed in logs, while the in°ation rate, nominal
7Appendix A provides a description of the data. Notice that the time period under investi-
gation is determined by the limited availability of the loan rate data.
15wage in°ation, commodity price in°ation and the interest rates are in percent.
The vector of constant terms comprises a linear trend and a constant. Choosing
a lag length of two ensures that the error terms dismiss signs of autocorrelation
and conditional heteroscedasticity.8
On the basis of the VAR model we generate impulse responses of the variables
in Zt to a monetary policy shock, which is identi¯ed by imposing a triangular
orthogonalization. The ordering of the variables implies that real output, the
in°ation rate, nominal wage in°ation and commodity price in°ation are a®ected
by an innovation in the policy rate with a lag of one quarter, while the loan rate
is a®ected within the same quarter. Figure 1 displays the impulse responses of
the variables to a one standard deviation monetary policy shock. The simulation
horizon covers 20 quarters. The solid lines denote impulse responses, which are
calculated as the Hall mean derived from a bootstrap procedure with 2000 replica-
tions (Hall, 1994). The shaded areas are 95% Hall percentile con¯dence intervals
of the bootstrapped impulse responses. Real output is expressed in percent terms,
while all other variables are expressed in units of percentage points at an annual
rate.
The impulse responses show that real output declines by degrees following
the monetary policy shock, reaching a trough after four quarters, and returns to
the baseline value subsequently.9 The in°ation rate initially increases before it
falls signi¯cantly after ¯ve quarters. The primary shift of in°ation re°ects a price
puzzle, which emerges although commodity price in°ation { as an indicator of
nascent in°ation { is explicitly incorporated. The in°ation rate reaches a trough
after around eight quarters before it gradually reverts to baseline. Nominal wage
in°ation declines slowly following the monetary policy shock, getting to a trough
after four quarters, and returns to the baseline value subsequently. Commodity
price in°ation drops instantaneously and recovers afterwards. The money market
rate initially increases, then declines temporally and returns to the baseline value
subsequently. The loan rate follows a similar pattern as the money market rate,
but the reaction is less pronounced, which shows that the pass{through from
short{term money market rates to short{term loan rates is incomplete.10
We re{estimate the VAR model without commodity price in°ation in order
8We run a variety of tests for misspeci¯cation and stability, which are not reported here, but
which are available upon request.
9Notice that the reaction of real output corresponds with the evolution of the output gap,
which is de¯ned by the log{deviation of the output level from a deterministic trend.
10We have analyzed this pattern in detail in HÄ ulsewig, Mayer, and WollmershÄ auser (2006).
16Figure 1: Empirical Impulse Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock
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Notes: Orthogonalized impulse responses to a monetary policy shock. The solid lines denote
impulse responses, which are calculated as the Hall mean derived from a bootstrap procedure
with 2000 replications (Hall, 1994). The shaded areas are 95% Hall percentile con¯dence
intervals of the bootstrapped impulse responses. Real output is expressed in percent terms,
while all other variables are expressed in units of percentage points at an annual rate. The
horizontal axis is in quarters. The dotted lines denote the impulse responses to a monetary
policy shock from an identically identi¯ed VAR that excludes CPINFLt from the vector of
endogenous variables.
17to assess the contribution of CPINFLt to mitigate the price puzzle. The impulse
responses are depicted in Figure 1 by the dotted lines, which show that the initial
reaction of in°ation after the monetary policy shock is more pronounced. This
is consistent with the results reported by Sims (1992), which indicate that the
inclusion of commodity prices helps to dampen the price puzzle.
Next we turn to the question whether the theoretical model has the ability to
replicate a price puzzle following a monetary policy shock. Before we present our
results, we brie°y discuss the estimation methodology applied.
3.2 Methodology
The estimation of our model builds on the following matrix representation:
¥0Xt = ¥1Xt¡1 + ­zzt + ­##t; (43)
where Xt is the state vector, zt is a vector of shocks and #t is a vector of expec-
tational errors that satisfy Et#t+1 = 0 for all t. The matrices ¥0, ¥1, ­z and ­#
contain the structural parameters of the model (Sims, 2001).
The closed loop dynamics of the model, which serves as a starting point to
generate impulse responses, is given by:
Xt(%) = £X(%)Xt¡1 + £z(%)zt; (44)
where the rational expectations equilibrium is solved by using the method devel-
oped by Sims (2001).11 For the matching of the impulse responses, we estimate
the following set of parameters:
% = (h ¹ S
00
Ã µp !p º µw !w ¿ ¹1 ¹2 ¹¼ ¹^ Y ¹¢^ Y);
by minimizing a distance measure between the theoretical impulse responses and
the empirical impulse responses.
The remaining parameters are calibrated according to values typically found
in related work (see for example Smets and Wouters, 2003, Del Negro et al. 2005,
and Leith and Malley, 2005, for estimations of DSGE models of the euro area).
The discount factor ¯ is ¯xed to 0.99, implying a 4% steady{state real interest
rate in a quarterly model. The elasticities of the households' utility function ¾
11We use the MATLAB ¯les gensys.m, gensysct.m, qzdiv.m, qzdivct.m, and qzswitch.m,
which can be downloaded from Chris Sims's web page.
18and ´ are both assumed to equal 2. The parameter capturing the mark{up in
wage setting Á is ¯xed to 3, which implies a 50% steady state mark{up. The
share of capital in production ® is set to 0.3. The depreciation rate ± is set to
0.025 per quarter, which implies an annual depreciation of capital equal to 10%.
The steady{state mark{up of intermediate good producers over nominal marginal
costs is set at 10 per cent, implying that ² = 11 (see Table 1 for a summary).
Table 1: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Calibration
Discount factor ¯ 0.99
Risk aversion ¾ 2.00
Labor supply elasticity ´ 2.00
Monopoly power of households (wage-setting) 1=Á 1/3
Depreciation rate ± 0.025
Production function ® 0.3
Monopoly power of ¯rms (price-setting) 1=² 1/11
The need for calibrating a sub{set of parameters is typically encountered in
the literature when DSGE models are estimated. One reason for this is that in an
unconstrained estimate these parameters are not identi¯ed. The decision of which
parameters to calibrate, however, is rarely discussed and varies from paper to
paper. We therefore propose to distinguish calibrated from estimated parameters
by their role for the dynamics of the economy. While the calibrated parameters
fully determine the evolution of the °exible price equilibrium of the economy
(which takes into account the monopoly power of ¯rms in the intermediate goods
market and of households in the labor market), the estimated parameters re°ect
the ine±ciencies resulting from real rigidities (h, ¹ S
00,Ã), nominal frictions (µp, !p,
µw, !w, ¿) and the cost channel (º), and the related policy response (¹1, ¹2, ¹¼,
¹^ Y, ¹¢^ Y).
The estimator of % minimizes the following distance function (Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans, 2005):
J =
³





^ ¡ ¡ ¡(%)
´
; (45)
where ^ ¡ denotes the empirical impulse responses, ¡(%) describes the mapping
from % to the theoretical impulse responses and V is the weighting matrix with the
19sample variances of ^ ¡ on the diagonal. The weighting matrix assures that those
point estimates with a smaller standard deviation are given a higher priority.12;13
3.3 Minimum Distance Estimation
We estimate the DSGE model by matching impulse responses to a monetary policy
shock. 14 The impulse responses are shown in Figure 2 together with the 95% error
bands. The model replicates the empirical impulse responses reasonably well as
all theoretical impulse responses lie within the error bounds. However, two main
di®erences are notable. (i) The in°ation rate initially exhibits a concave reaction,
which is however never positive. While this response is consistent with the cost
channel, its presence is not strong enough to replicate the price puzzle. (ii) The
reaction of nominal wage in°ation departs in the degree of inertia, which is clearly
more pronounced in the theoretical adjustment than in the empirical adjustment.
Before getting into a more detailed discussion on the relevance of the cost
channel for explaining the price puzzle, we present the parameter estimates that
minimize the distance function J. The point estimates for the parameters in the
vector % and the related standard errors are summarized in Table 2. The standard
errors are computed using the delta function method.15 As the point estimates
12An e±cient estimate of % would require the use of the inverse of the complete variance{
covariance matrix W of impulse responses as a weighting matrix. However, as in Giannoni and
Woodford (2005) and Boivin and Giannoni (2006), such a weighting matrix appears to hinder
the convergence of the optimization routine.
13We use the MATLAB optimization routine fmincon, which attempts to ¯nd a constrained
minimum of a scalar function of several variables, starting at an initial estimate. This is generally
referred to as constrained nonlinear optimization. A limitation of the algorithm, which uses
a sequential quadratic programming method, is that it might only give local solutions. In
Appendix B we check whether our estimates are robust against the choice of the initial conditions
%0 = (0:5 2:5 50 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5 1:5 ¡ 0:5 1:5 1:5 1:5), which is the mean of the lower
(%¡ = (0:01 0:01 0 0:01 0:01 0 0:01 0:01 0:01 1:00 ¡1:00 1:05 0:00 0:00)) and the upper boundary
(%¡ = (0:99 5:00 100 0:99 0:99 1 0:99 0:99 0:99 2:00 0:00 2:00 3:00 3:00)) of the constrained
optimization. As a further prerequisite for the reliability of the estimates we take care that
the optimization algorithm converges and that the solution of the rational expectations model
exists and is unique.
14As commodity prices are neglected in the DSGE model, their impulse response function is
excluded from the minimum distance estimation.
15Following Altig et al. (2005) let g(^ %; ^ ¡) = J^ %(^ %; ^ ¡) = 0 denote the ¯rst order condition
associated with the solution to the minimization of (45). Denote the mapping in (45) by
^ % = f(^ ¡). To obtain the sampling variance of the estimator, ^ %, as a function of the sampling
variance of ^ ¡, the delta function method approximates f(^ ¡) by its linear expansion about the
20Figure 2: Model Impulse Responses
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Notes: For the estimated impulse responses see notes to Figure 1.
true value of ¡, ¡0. That is, f(^ ¡) ¼ f(¡0)+f0(¡0)(^ ¡¡¡0). Here, f(¡0) = %0, where %0 is the true
value of %, by the consistency of our estimator. Then,
p
N(^ %N ¡%0) is asymptotically normally
distributed with mean zero and variance f0(¡0)Wf0(¡0)T, where N is the number of bootstraps
used in the calculation of the empirical impulse responses, T indicates the transposition operator,
and W is the asymptotic variance{covariance matrix of
p
N(^ ¡N ¡ ¡0). We use the implicit
function theorem to approximate f0(¡0) by ¡g
¡1
1 g2, where g1 and g2 are the partial derivatives
of g with respect to % and ¡, evaluated at %0 and ¡0. In practice, W is replaced by its sample
estimate, as are %0 and ¡0 in the expression for f0. The standard errors reported in Table 2 are
the relevant diagonal terms in f0(¡0)Wf0(¡0)T, after taking square roots and dividing by
p
N.
Note that the weighting matrix V in (45) is a diagonal matrix composed of the diagonal elements
of W. For the calculation of the standard errors we used modi¯ed versions of the MATLAB
¯les ComputeStdErrors.m, g1g2Func.m, and MomentFunction.m, which can be downloaded
21for Ã and º coincide with the upper boundary of the constrained optimization,
we add them to the group of calibrated parameters and therefore do not report
standard errors.16
Table 2: Parameter Estimates
Parameter Estimate Standard error
Habit formation h 0.91 0.09
Investment adjustment costs ¹ S
00 3.18 0.40
Capital utilization variability Ã 100 |
Price stickiness µp 0.56 0.19
Rule-of-thumb prices !p 0.71 0.05
Share of cost channel ¯rms º 1.00 |
Wage stickiness µw 0.61 0.14
Rule{of{thumb wages !w 0.38 0.12
Loan rate stickiness ¿ 0.41 0.03
Taylor rule: smoothing ¹1 1.32 0.13
Taylor rule: smoothing ¹2 -0.52 0.11
Taylor rule: in°ation ¹¼ 1.16 0.11
Taylor rule: output gap ¹^ Y 0.57 0.19
Taylor rule: output gap growth rate ¹¢^ Y 0.58 0.12
Notes: The value of the distance function J is 53.70 with a probability of 0.9948. The probability
is calculated by employing a Â2{distribution with 85 degrees of freedom. The degrees of freedom
are calculated as the di®erence between the total number of estimated observations on the
impulse response functions (97) and the number of estimated parameters (12). As the value
of the distance function falls below the 1% critical value of the Â2{distribution, the imposed
overidentifying restrictions cannot be rejected.
In the consumption Euler equation the estimated degree of habit formation
is substantial and indicates that the response of consumption to an interest rate
shock is largely driven by habits. This estimate appears to validate the claim
of Rudebusch and Fuhrer (2005) that the degree of forward{looking behavior
in consumption is limited (see also Giannoni and Woodford, 2005, and Nelson,
Andr¶ es and L¶ opez{Salido, 2005). Given a calibrated intertemporal elasticity of
substitution of 1=¾ = 1=2 our estimate implies that an expected one percentage
from Lawrence Christiano's web page.
16In Appendix B we show that the estimated parameters are properly identi¯ed in the con-
strained parameter space. In order to take into account the uncertainty surrounding the concrete
values of the calibrated parameters, we also check the robustness of the estimates for % against
variations of the calibrated parameters (see Appendix C).
22point increase in the real short{term interest rate for four quarters has an impact
on consumption of round about 0.045%.17
The estimate of the adjustment cost parameter in investment dynamics is
somewhat smaller than the value reported by Smets and Wouters (2003) who
estimate a value of 5.9. Our estimate of 3.18 implies that investment increases
by 0.31% following a one percent increase in the current price of installed capital.
Calibrating the elasticity of capital utilization with respect to the rental rate of
capital Ã to 100 is in line with the calibration of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Evans (2005) and the estimate reported by Rabanal (2007).
The supply side of the model exhibits a considerable degree of stickiness in
prices and wages, and additionally reveals a prominent role for backward{looking
behavior in price{ and wage{setting decisions. For price setters the estimate
of µp = 0:56 implies that prices are ¯xed on average for 2.3 quarters.18 This
result is at the lower end of estimates reported in other studies for the euro area.
Del Negro et. al. (2005) estimate an average price duration of three quarters
using full information Bayesian techniques; Gal¶ ³, Gertler, and L¶ opez-Salido (2001)
report values of round about four quarters using a single equation GMM approach;
Welz (2006) who also applies Bayesian techniques to a DSGE model estimates
a duration of 6.5 quarters. On the upper end Smets and Wouters (2003) ¯nd
evidence that price contracts last on average for ten quarters.19 Empirical work
17The interest rate elasticity of consumption can be calculated by iterating the consumption





18The Calvo speci¯cation implies that the average duration of ¯xed prices is computed by
(1 ¡ µp)¡1.
19Note that the estimates of Smets and Wouters (2003) and Del Negro et. al. (2005) are
not strictly comparable to our estimates. While we have speci¯ed the Phillips curve as in Gal¶ ³,
Gertler, and L¶ opez-Salido (2001), Smets and Wouters (2003) and Del Negro et. al. (2005)
follow the speci¯cation as proposed by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005). In this
framework all price setters adjust prices in every period. Thus there is no price stickiness in
a strict sense. The parameter 1 ¡ µp in their framework denotes the share of optimizers while
µp denotes the share of price setters that partially index prices to last periods in°ation rate.
This means that all price setters adjust prices, and only a fraction of 1 ¡ µp adjusts optimally.
Therefore, the average price duration indicates how long it takes on average before being allowed
to re{optimize. In the framework applied by Gal¶ ³, Gertler, and L¶ opez-Salido (2001) we have
true price stickiness in the sense that a fraction of µp of price setters is not allowed to change
prices at all. The remaining mass of 1 ¡ µp is divided into two subgroups: a fraction !p that
adjusts prices according to a complete indexation rule, and a fraction 1 ¡ !p that optimizes.
The main reason for applying the framework of Gal¶ ³, Gertler, and L¶ opez-Salido (2001) instead
of the partial indexation framework of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) is that the
23on price setting in the euro area using micro consumer price data also reports
relatively low price durations with a median of around 3.5 quarters (see ¶ Alvarez
et al., 2006, for a summary of recent micro evidence). Comparable studies for the
U.S. like Altig et. al. (2005) report much lower average price durations of just
1.6 quarters, which they claim to be more consistent with recent evidence drawn
from US micro{data.
Our results additionally indicate that backward{looking price setting behavior
plays a prominent role as 71% of all price adjusters reset their prices in each period
by complete indexing to past in°ation. The empirical evidence on the degree of
partial indexation of prices to past in°ation rates in the euro area vary from
0.29 to 0.75. Leith and Malley (2005) estimated a value of 0.29, while Coenen,
McAdam, and Straub (2007) propose to calibrate the degree of indexation to a
value of 0.75.
The share of cost channel ¯rms is 1, implying that all ¯rms consider short{
term ¯nancial costs to be relevant for price setting. This value is signi¯cantly
higher than in Rabanal (2007) who estimated the share of cost channel ¯rms in
the U.S. to be 0.15 (with a standard error of 0.13). In the next Section we show
that a restriction of º = 0 is rejected by the data.
Wages seem to be as sticky as prices in the euro area with an average wage
duration of 2.6 quarters. Rabanal and Rubio{Ramirez (2003) report a smaller
estimate with an average duration of 1.2 quarters, while Smets and Wouters
(2003) and Leith and Malley (2005) propose value of 4.1 and 7.7, respectively.20
Our estimate for !p indicates that the share of backward{looking agents among
those who adjust wages is 38%. Leith and Malley (2005) who also apply the
complete indexation framework report a share of 17%. Using a partial indexation
model Smets and Wouters (2003) estimate the degree of wage indexation to be
0.66, while Rabanal and Rubio{Ramirez (2003) report a value of 0.34.
The signi¯cant estimate for ¿ reveals that the banking industry plays a mean-
ingful role in propagating monetary shocks. The degree of loan rate stickiness
was estimated to be 0.41, which implies that loan rates are ¯xed on average for
former better ¯ts the data. Replacing equations (36) and (38) with their partial indexation
counterparts (see equations (32) and (33) in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans, 2005) results
in a 10% higher value of the distance function J.
20Note that for the same reasons as laid out in the previous footnote the estimates are not
directly comparable as Smets and Wouters (2003) and Rabanal and Rubio{Ramirez (2003)
aggregate wage setters as proposed by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), while we
apply the aggregation framework of Gal¶ ³, Gertler, and L¶ opez-Salido (2001).
241.7 quarters. Thus, stickiness in ¯nancial markets is substantially lower than in
goods and labor markets. This feature of the model extends earlier ¯ndings by
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and Ravenna and Walsh (2006), who
model the banking industry as a neutral conveyor of monetary shocks. Their
model of the banking industry can be regarded as a special case of our model
with ¿ = 0.
The Taylor rule coe±cients display the familiar values. The estimate of the
in°ation coe±cient is 1.16 and the output gap coe±cient is 0.57. In addition
we also ¯nd evidence for a signi¯cant response to the change in the output gap.
This ¯nding is in line with Smets and Wouters (2003) and theoretical suggestions
of Walsh (2003). The autoregressive interest rate coe±cients sum up to 0.80,
indicating a substantial degree of interest rate smoothing, which is reported in
most of the literature.
4 Relevance of the Cost Channel for the Price
Puzzle
According to the traditional aggregate demand channel the initial response of in-
°ation after a monetary contraction should be negative and convex as both, the
real rental rate of capital and real wages immediately fall on a convex impulse
response function. This result holds irrespective of the concrete parametrization
of the theoretical model. Thus, a price puzzle cannot be produced if monetary
policy is solely transmitted via the aggregate demand channel. The cost channel
counteracts the cost{reducing aggregate demand channel as the loan rate posi-
tively a®ects real marginal costs both, directly (see equation (37)) and indirectly
via the real rental rate of capital (see equation (37) in conjunction with equation
(34)). If the cost channel is active, the initial response of in°ation to a monetary
policy shock may turn concave and possibly { depending on the parametrization
of the model { positive.
4.1 A Re{calibration of the Baseline Model
Even though the VAR model clearly showed that there is a price puzzle in the
data, the minimum distance estimation was unsuccessful in ¯nding parameters
that replicate the increase in in°ation following a positive monetary policy shock
in the DSGE model. The purpose of this Section is to uncover those parameters
25in the model that would increase the initial supply{side e®ects of monetary policy.
Figure 3 shows the responses of in°ation to a monetary policy shock in the ¯rst
four quarters following the shock. The solid lines show the impulse responses
of the baseline parametrization of the model (see Tables 1 and 2). The dotted
and dashed{dotted lines show the impulse responses of the model, in which only
the parameter displayed on the top of the graph is altered, while the remaining
parameters are ¯xed at their baseline values.






























































































Notes: Responses of in°ation to a monetary policy shock in the ¯rst four quarters following
the shock. The solid lines show the impulse responses of the baseline parametrization of the
model (see Tables 1 and 2). The dotted and dashed{dotted lines show the impulse responses
of the model, in which only the parameter displayed on the top of the graph is altered, while
the remaining parameters are ¯xed at their baseline values.
26Most of the impulse responses exhibit the concave pattern that indicates the
existence of a cost channel. The most \powerful" parameter for creating a price
puzzle is the degree of wage rigidity. The higher nominal wage rigidity is, the
less pronounced is the decline in real wages after a monetary contraction and the
more e®ective is the cost{augmenting impact of the loan rate. Increasing µw to
0.7 (which means that on average wages are adjusted every 3.3 quarters) results
in a positive response of in°ation in the ¯rst two quarters. Note however that
the peak of the response is still well below the empirical impulse response which
peaks in t = 1 with an in°ation rate equal to 0.08.
An initial increase in in°ation can also be generated by a lower degree of price
stickiness µp. If the °exibility of prices increases relative to the °exibility of wages,
the decline in real wages after a monetary contraction becomes smaller, which in
turn strengthens the e®ectiveness of the cost channel. Thus, we come to the same
conclusion as Rabanal (2007) who shows that a high real wage stickiness { either
caused by a high µw or a low µp { is essential for the cost channel to explain a
price puzzle.
An increase of the investment adjustment costs ¹ S
00 also contributes to creating
the price puzzle. In this case the impact on real marginal costs is rather complex
as a higher ¹ S
00 ¯rst of all reduces the impact of Tobin's Q, and hence of the
real rental rate of capital, on the households' investment decisions. In essence,
the increase of ¹ S
00 reduces the decline in b rK
t after a monetary contraction, which
creates a bias towards more labor intensive production and retards the decline in
real wages. Over all, the e®ectiveness of the cost channel is strengthened.
The variations of the loan rate stickiness ¿ are also of particular interest. In
the case of ¿ = 1, the loan rate is una®ected by changes in the money market rate.
Thus, the cost channel is shut down and the response of in°ation to a monetary
policy shock is convex as expected from the demand{side transmission channels.
By contrast, in the case of ¿ = 0, banks refrain from smoothing interest rates
and the loan rate exactly follows the money market rate. The more pronounced
response of the loan rate is then su±cient to overcompensate the fall in the real
rental rate of capital and in real wages so that in°ation responds positively to a
monetary policy shock.
The remaining parameters cannot be used to generate an increase in in°ation.
While a higher degree of habit formation h only makes the response more concave,
changes in the degree of rule{of{thumb price and wage setters, !p and !w, only
have negligible short{run e®ects on the response of in°ation.
274.2 Restricted Model Estimations
In order to see whether the re{calibrations are supported by the data, we re{
estimate the parameters of the DSGE model by imposing restrictions on those
parameters, which are important for the cost channel explanation of the price
puzzle. Table 3 summarizes the parameter estimates and Figure 4 shows the
impulse responses of the in°ation rate to a monetary contraction resulting from
the restricted model. The ¯rst row of the Table shows the parameters, which have
been restricted. The ¯gures in bold indicate the value of the restricted parameter
that has been imposed on the minimum distance estimation. Jr denotes the value
of the distance function resulting from the restricted estimation. The p{value
indicates the probability that the null hypothesis of a valid parameter restriction
can be rejected. It is calculated from a distance metric test (see Meier and MÄ uller,
2006) under the assumption that the deviation of the restricted value of the
distance function from the unrestricted value of the distance function, Jr ¡ J
with J = 53:70 (see Table 2), is asymptotically distributed as Â2 with degrees of
freedom equal to the number of restrictions imposed.
Table 3: Parameter Estimates with Restrictions
º h ¹ S
00 Ã µp µw µp & µw ¿
h 0.99 0.99 0.86 0.92 0.94 0.93 0.94 0.89
¹ S
00 3.75 2.42 5.00 3.25 2.70 2.43 2.48 3.33
Ã 100 100 100 0.00 100 100 100 100
µp 0.38 0.55 0.57 0.79 0.35 0.43 0.35 0.48
!p 0.74 0.71 0.71 0.76 0.71 0.72 0.71 0.72
º 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.72 1.00 0.83 0.79
µw 0.62 0.63 0.60 0.32 0.68 0.70 0.70 0.63
!w 0.35 0.39 0.36 0.38 0.53 0.48 0.54 0.41
¿ 0.39 0.41 0.41 0.39 0.40 0.41 0.40 0.25
¹1 1.34 1.32 1.32 1.47 1.34 1.32 1.33 1.30
¹2 -0.57 -0.52 -0.51 -0.64 -0.54 -0.52 -0.53 -0.41
¹¼ 1.05 1.22 1.15 1.85 1.13 1.18 1.15 1.47
¹^ Y 0.35 0.52 0.60 0.11 0.65 0.66 0.67 2.27
¹¢^ Y 0.68 0.63 0.59 1.16 0.60 0.58 0.59 0.41
Jr 62.16 54.24 54.17 59.40 56.45 55.55 56.61 65.87
p 0.004 0.460 0.494 0.017 0.097 0.173 0.234 0.001
The ¯rst column of Table 3 is included in order to gain information on the
signi¯cance of the share of cost channel ¯rms º. As in the baseline estimation
28the parameter estimate of º hit the upper boundary, we were not able to report
reliable standard errors. A model without cost channel ¯rms (º = 0) fails { as
expected { to generate a price puzzle and returns a strictly convex response of
in°ation to a monetary contraction. More importantly, the value of the distance
function exceeds the value of the baseline estimation by 16%, implying that the
imposed restriction is rejected by the distance metric test at the 1% level.
Figure 4: Parameter Restrictions { Impulse Responses of In°ation
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Notes: Responses of in°ation to a monetary policy shock. The solid lines and the shaded areas
show the empirical impulse responses (see notes to Figure 1). The lines with a cross show the
impulse responses of the model, which has been re{estimated with the parameter restriction
displayed on the top of the graph (see Table 3 for the corresponding parameter estimates).
Concerning the remaining parameter restrictions, only those imposed on the
degree of price and wage stickiness produce a positive response of in°ation for two
29quarters without being rejected by the data. Setting µp = 0:35 and/or µw = 0:70
only marginally increases the value of the distance function, so that the distance
metric test fails to reject the null hypothesis at the conventional 5% level. The
restriction on the investment adjustment cost parameter ¹ S
00 is fully compensated
by a decrease in the degree of habit formation h. Even though the restriction
is accepted by the data, the price puzzle obtained in the previous Section (see
Figure 3) vanishes. Finally, imposing a lower degree of loan rate stickiness ¿ still
results in a slight increase of in°ation following the monetary contraction; the
restriction is, however, rejected by the distance metric test.
5 Conclusion
We estimated a New Keynesian DSGE model for the euro area with the intention
to explore whether the cost channel is capable to generate an increase in in°ation
after a monetary contraction. The model incorporated the idea that ¯rms require
loans from banks as they are obliged to pre{¯nance production due to a lack of
working capital, which implies that in°ation is directly a®ected by interest rates.
We estimated the model by means of a minimum distance approach.
Our ¯ndings suggest that the cost channel in the euro area fails to produce
a price puzzle in an unrestricted regression, but its presence helps to explain an
initially concave response of in°ation to a monetary policy contraction. The drop
in in°ation is retarded in the ¯rst quarters after the shock, before it pursues the
traditional hump{shaped and convex response, which can be attributed to the
sluggish reaction of real marginal costs that comes along with the simultaneous
increase in interest rates and decreases in the real wage and the real rental rate
of capital. An immediate increase of in°ation only arose after incorporating a
higher degree of nominal wage rigidity and/or a lower degree of price stickiness.
Interestingly, already small deviations from the estimated parameters, which were
not rejected by the data, were su±cient to create the price puzzle.
Our analysis is complementary to the work of Rabanal (2007), who investigates
the relevance of the cost channel in the U.S. as a possible explanation for the
price puzzle using a DSGE model very similar to the one presented here. His
results showed that the cost channel not only fails to generate a positive response
of in°ation after a monetary contraction, but also an initially concave impulse
response function. Thus, according to his estimates the traditional demand{side
e®ect of monetary policy dominates the supply{side e®ect.
30The main di®erence between the two papers lies in the estimated degree of
price and wage stickiness and the estimate for the share of cost channel ¯rms.
Rabanal (2007) estimates µw at 0.35 (average wage duration of 1.5 quarters) and
µp at 0.84 (average price duration of 6.25 quarters), which implies that nominal
wages are less sticky and prices are more sticky in the U.S. than in the euro
area. A lower real wage stickiness considerably weakens the e®ectiveness of the
cost channel relative to the aggregate demand channel, so that the existence of
a cost channel cannot be inferred from the impulse response functions anymore.
Moreover, according to his estimates cost channel ¯rms only account for 15% of all
intermediate goods producers (with a standard error of 13%), while our estimates
for the euro area implied that all ¯rms depend on credit to ¯nance production.
A higher share of cost channel ¯rms clearly increases the importance of ¯nancial
costs as a driving factor for price changes, which is in accordance with recent
micro evidence on the price setting behavior of European ¯rms. An explanation
for this result is the widely acknowledged fact, that unlike in the U.S. the ¯nancial
system in continental European countries is mainly bank{based. We accounted for
this di®erence in the ¯nancial structure by explicitly modeling (and estimating)
the behavior of ¯nancial intermediaries. Instead of modeling banks as neutral
conveyors of monetary impulses, we took into account the empirical evidence of
sticky and incomplete pass{through from money market rates to short{term loan
rates in the euro area and incorporated a banking sector that sets the loan rate
according to a Calvo{type staggered price setting approach. According to our
estimates short{term loan rates are ¯xed on average for 1.7 quarters. While this
modeling strategy clearly dampens the e®ectiveness of the cost channel, it is an
integral part of a bank{based ¯nancial system and has to be jointly interpreted
with the estimated high dependency of ¯rms on external ¯nance.
31Appendices
A Data Base
The data is taken from the Euro Area Wide Model (AWM, update 5, 1970Q1 {
2003Q4) { see Fagan, Henry, and Mestre (2001) and www.ecb.org { except for the
loan rate data, which has been kindly provided by the ECB. Our sample covers
the period from 1990Q1 to 2002Q4 due to the limited availability of a continuous
time series for the loan rate.
1. GDP: Log of real GDP, seasonally adjusted (AWM code: YER).
2. INFL: In°ation rate, annualized quarterly change of GDP de°ator in percent,
seasonally adjusted (AWM code: YED).
3. WINFL: Nominal wage in°ation, annualized quarterly change of wage rate in
percent (AWM code: WRN)
4. CPINFL: Commodity price in°ation, annualized quarterly change of com-
modity prices in percent (AWM code: COMPR)
5. RM: Short{term nominal interest rate, in percent (AWM code: STN).
6. RL: Retail bank lending rates for loans to enterprizes with maturities up to
one year, nominal in percent.
B Identi¯cation of the Parameters
Identi¯ability is a crucial condition needed for any empirical methodology to
deliver sensible estimates and meaningful inference. The parameters are identi¯ed
if the objective function has a unique minimum and displays su±cient curvature
in all relevant dimensions. In a recent paper Canova and Sala (2005) provide some
diagnostic tools to detect identi¯cation problems related to moment estimators
when the objective function measures the distance between empirical and model
impulse responses.
For each parameter Figure 5 plots the shape of the objective function in the
close neighborhood of the optimum. The horizontal axis depicts the di®erence
between the value of the objective function J as a function of the parameter shown
on the top of each graph, conditional on the other parameters being ¯xed at their
32baseline estimates, and the baseline value of the objective function (J = 53:70).
For most of the structural parameters the curvature of the objective functions is
su±cient to identify a minimum. Therefore, we can conclude that the responses to
monetary policy shocks are very informative in that they can be used to identify
most of the structural parameters.
















































































































































Notes: The vertical axis depicts the di®erence between the value of the objective function
J as a function of the parameter shown on the top of each graph, conditional on the other
parameters being ¯xed at their baseline estimates, and the baseline value of the objective
function (J = 53:70). The horizontal axis indicates the range, within which the parameters
were varied in steps of 0.01 (0.2 in the case of Ã).
The only exceptions are the shapes of the objective function with respect to
the the capital utilization parameter Ã and the share of cost channel ¯rms º.
33As both estimates hit the upper boundary of the constrained optimization, the
objective function is falling in the neighborhood of the boundary. While the
upper boundary of º is binding as it de¯nes a share of ¯rms that cannot exceed
1, the upper boundary for Ã is less stringent. Theoretically, Ã may go to in¯nity,
implying that the rental rate of capital is ¯xed.21
Investigating the curvature of the objective function in one dimension is insuf-
¯cient to guarantee that the optimization routine detects a global minimum in the
constrained parameter space. If the objective function has ridges, °at regions or
local minima, the vector of the parameter estimates ^ % may depend on the vector
of initial values %0. In order to properly identify the parameters we started the
optimization routine 500 times from di®erent initial conditions uniformly drawn
within the ranges de¯ned by the bounds of the constrained optimization. The
histograms in Figure 6 show the densities of estimates, which are obtained after
eliminating the 185 cases where either convergence failed, or the estimated para-
meters produced imaginary or indeterminate solutions. The ¯gure on the top of
each graph is the mode of the distribution of the estimated parameters.22
There are two interesting results that can be drawn from the histograms. First,
the great majority of the estimates for Ã and º hit the upper boundary. Second,
for the remaining parameters the distributions are very peaked with modes that
are close to the baseline estimates of the structural parameters shown in Table
2. Such a distribution can be regarded as further evidence for properly identi¯ed
parameters.
To gain further insight we ordered the vector of parameter estimates by the
value of the distance function, starting with the lowest value. The lower right
graph in Figure 7 shows that 251 out of 315 draws of initial values result in a
value of the distance function equal to 53.70. The horizontal lines that can be
found in all graphs indicate that these parameter estimates are associated with
the minimum of the distance function. The ¯gures on the top of each graph,
which are the parameter estimates corresponding to the draw with the lowest
value of the distance function, are identical with the parameter estimates shown
21Setting Ã = 1000 reduces the value of the distance function from 53.70 to 53.68, without
changing any of the remaining parameter estimates.
22Here the mode is de¯ned as the center of the bin of the histogram that contains the most
frequently occurring estimate. In each histogram we set the number of bins equal to 50. The
bin width can be calculated as the di®erence between the upper and lower range divided by the
number of bins. Hence, for a bin size of 50 the most frequently occurring estimate for h is in
the range of 0:92 § 0:01, implying a bin width of 0:02.



























































































































Notes: The histograms show the density of estimates obtained starting the optimization routine
500 times from di®erent initial conditions uniformly drawn within the ranges considered on
the horizontal axis. The ¯gure on the top of each graph is the mode of the distribution of the
estimated parameters.
35in Table 2. The graphs for Ã and º further show that in the constrained parameter
space, the upper boundary is indeed associated with the minimum of the distance
function.
Figure 7: Ordered Distribution of Estimates






































































































































Notes: The vertical axis depicts the draws ordered by the value of the distance function,
starting with the lowest value. The horizontal axis depicts the parameter estimates. The ¯gure
on the top of each graph is the parameter estimate corresponding to the draw with the lowest
value of the distance function.
C Robustness against Variation of Calibrated Parameters
When a subset of model parameters is calibrated, an important matter is whether
the estimates of the remaining model parameters are robust against changes in
the calibrated parameters. Figures 8 to 13 show the estimation results when one
36calibrated parameter was altered, conditional on the other calibrated parameters
being ¯xed at their baseline values shown in Table 1. The horizontal axes indicate
the range, within which the calibrated parameter under consideration was varied.
The range has been chosen so as to best represent the uncertainty about the
parameters found in the literature (see Table 4). As initial values we took the
parameter estimates of the baseline estimation (see Table 2).
Table 4: Values for Calibrated Parameters in the Literature
¯ ¾ ´ Á ± ® ²
Smets and Wouters (2003) 0.99 1.61 1.19 3 0.025 0.3 -
Del Negro et al. (2005) 0.99 1 2.20 4.3 0.025 0.17 4.3
Leith and Malley (2005) 0.93 2.02 1.5 11 - 0.31 11
Rabanal (2003) 0.99 3.85 1 6 - 0.36 6
Rabanal and Rubio{Ramirez (2003) 0.99 5.88 1.64 6 - 0.36 6
Notes: All the papers cited in the Table estimated a DSGE model for the euro area with
Bayesian techniques. The ¯gures in the Table show the value of the calibrated parameters. If
¯gures are in bold, the parameters have been estimated.
Except for some graphs in Figure 8 the parameter estimates depend monoton-
ically on the calibrated parameters. If the degree of risk aversion ¾ increases,
the estimate of the investment adjustment costs ¹ S
00 falls and the central bank
becomes more sensitive to movements in the in°ation rate. The largest impact
of the two parameters describing the households' supply of labor, ´ and Á, is on
the wage setting rigidities, µw and !w, which are decreasing functions of ´ and
Á. Moreover, if ´ increases, the estimate for the investment adjustment costs
¹ S
00 and for the degree of price stickiness µp increases, whereas the central bank's
response to in°ation ¹¼ decreases. The depreciation rate ± basically in°uences
the estimate of the investment adjustment costs ¹ S
00, which become larger for a
higher value of ±. The production function parameter ® has the broadest impact
on the parameter estimates. The higher the capital share of output is, the lower
is the estimated degree of habit formation h, the price rigidity parameters µp and
!p and the central bank's response to output gap growth ¹¢^ Y, and the higher is
the investment adjustment costs ¹ S
00, the wage setting rigidities µw and !w, and
the central bank's response to in°ation ¹¼ and the output gap ¹^ Y. Variations
of the inverse of the monopoly power of ¯rms ² only a®ect the estimate of the
investment adjustment costs ¹ S
00, which become larger for a higher value of ².
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